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Employment Discrimination

by Peter Reed Corbin'
and John E. Duvall"
Clearly the most significant case handed down during the 2015 survey
period' was the March 2015 decision by the United States Supreme
Court in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.2 In Young, the Supreme

Court decided that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)' does, in
fact, require employers to offer workplace accommodations to pregnant
employees in order to remain on the job.4 This case has almost
certainly required a host of employers to review and probably revise the
leave policies they had in place prior to the decision being handed down.
Otherwise, the 2015 survey period was a busy, but unspectacular, year.
Of course, in what has become an annual tradition, there was the usual
large number of unpublished (and often per curiam) decisions handed
down by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
most of which were decisions affirming summary judgment in favor of
the employer.
* Of counsel to the law firm of FordHarrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. University
of Virginia (B.A., 1970); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1975). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
** Of counsel to the law firm of FordHarrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. Florida State
University (B.S., 1973); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cun
laude, 1985). Member, State Bar of Florida.
This Article covers significant cases in the area of employment discrimination law
decided by the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit during 2015. Cases arising under the following federal statutes are
included: Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(2012); the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (2012); Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012); and
the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
1. For analysis of Eleventh Circuit employment discrimination law during the prior
survey period, see Peter Reed Corbin & John E. Duvall, Employment Discrimination,
Eleventh Circuit Survey, 66 MERCER L. REV. 927 (2015).
2. 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
4. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344.
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TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

A.

Disparate'leatment
In Flowers v. Troup County,' the Eleventh Circuit was confronted
with the issue of whether the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence
of pretext to allow his race discrimination claim to go to a jury.' The
plaintiff worked as a high school football coach for Troup High School in

Troup County, Georgia. When he was hired in 2010, the plaintiff had
been the first black head football coach in Troup County since the school
district was desegregated in 1973. In the spring of 2011, the plaintiff's
coaching career was placed in jeopardy in the face of certain alleged
recruiting violations involving some of his players. The district school
board hired a private investigator to look into the recruiting issues. The
private investigator found that the mother of one of Flowers' star football
players had been evicted from her Troup County apartment (thus
making the player ineligible because he could not meet the residency
requirement). The investigator also found that the plaintiff had
intervened by personally making rental payments to secure the

apartment. Thereafter, the school superintendent fired the plaintiff
based upon the investigative report. The plaintiff filed an action under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 alleging race discrimination.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school
district.'
On appeal, the plaintiff made three arguments that he had created a
jury question on the issue of pretext.'o The Eleventh Circuit rejected
all three." First, the plaintiff argued that there was insufficient
evidence to find he had committed the recruiting violations. 2 The
court of appeals determined that it was "irrelevant whether [the
plaintiff] had actually committed a recruiting violation."'" Rather, the
superintendent fired the plaintiff based on "an honest belief" the plaintiff
had committed recruiting violations, and that was enough to show the

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

803 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1333.
Id. at 1332-33.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
Flowers, 803 F.3d at 1333.
Id. at 1333-34.
Id. at 1334.
Id. at 1333-34.
Id. at 1334.
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superintendent did not fire the plaintiff on a pretext. 4 Second, the
Eleventh Circuit rejected the comparators the plaintiff put forth, holding
no reasonable person would have found them sufficiently "similarly
situated."" Finally, the Eleventh Circuit held the plaintiff failed to
present "a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence" showing he had
been the victim of race discrimination.16 Rejecting all three arguments,
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court.' 7

B.

Retaliation
The plaintiff in Perry v. Rogers,'s was one of the few plaintiffs during
this survey period who succeeded in getting an employer's summary
judgment reversed on appeal."9 The plaintiff was one of three plaintiffs
who brought claims of race discrimination and retaliation against their
employer, the Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) Board. The
plaintiff worked as an Administrative Support Assistant II, a role in
which she was responsible for answering the telephone and filing and
retrieving documents. The plaintiff's supervisor subjected her to two
disciplinary actions relevant to her claim of retaliation. The first was a
written reprimand for tardiness and insubordination, and the second
was a three-day suspension for violating leave policies and procedures.
Before the plaintiff left for her suspension, her supervisor instructed her
to create a staffing schedule to cover the switch board while she was
gone. The plaintiff forgot to do so. When she returned from her
suspension, she was confronted by her supervisor, who chided her for
insubordination. Following this encounter, the plaintiff left the building.
When she did not return to work after a few days, the defendant sent
her a letter advising that her actions constituted job abandonment and
voluntary resignation.20
In the plaintiff's subsequent lawsuit under Title VII, the district court
granted summary judgment for the defendant on all counts. 2 ' On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the defendant's "close
monitoring and disciplinary decisions" within a month after the plaintiff
filed her Title VII lawsuit were sufficient to create a jury question on the

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1335.
Id. at 1341.
627 F. App'x 823 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 825.
Id. at 824, 825-27.
Id. at 842.
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issue of retaliation.2 2 The court of appeals was also influenced by
evidence that another manager had commented to the plaintiff's
supervisor after the plaintiff walked off the job, "Man, you set her up,"
while making a "thumbs-up gesture" toward the supervisor.2 3 This
evidence, coupled with the close temporal proximity between the filing
of the plaintiff's lawsuit and the subsequent disciplinary actions, was
sufficient to create a disputed issue of material fact. 24 Accordingly, the
court of appeals reversed and remanded with respect to the plaintiff's
retaliation claim.25
C.

Pregnancy DiscriminationAct
Easily the most widely discussed case during the survey period was

the Supreme Court opinion Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 26 The

issue before the Court was how the PDA applies "in the context of an
employer's policy that accommodates many, but not all, workers with
nonpregnancy-related disabilities." 27 The plaintiff was employed as a
part-time driver for the United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS). Her duties
included picking-up and delivering packages that had arrived by air
carrier the previous evening. The plaintiff became pregnant. Her doctor
advised her that she could not lift more than 20 pounds during the first
20 weeks of her pregnancy and could not lift more than 10
pounds thereafter. However, the requirements of the plaintiff's job as a
part-time driver required her to lift parcels weighing up to 70 pounds
(and up to 150 pounds with assistance). Accordingly, UPS advised the
plaintiff that she could not work while under her lifting restriction. 2 8
The plaintiff then brought suit pursuant to Title VII, alleging UPS
violated Title VII and the PDA by refusing to accommodate her
"pregnancy-related lifting restriction. "29
UPS had a policy that
accommodated workers who had been injured on the job, had a disability
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)," or had lost their
Department of Transportation (DOT) certification." The district court

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 833-34.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 834.
135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
Id. at 1343-44.
Id. at 1344.
Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1347.
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granted summary judgment in favor of UPS, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.3 2
The Supreme Court rejected the broad interpretation of the PDA
advocated by the plaintiff and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), as well as the narrow interpretation advocated by
the defendant, and adopted more of a middle ground approach." The
Supreme Court held pregnant plaintiffs could establish disparate
treatment under the PDA by following McDonnell Douglas v. Green"
and the decision's long-established circumstantial evidence model of
proof.35 Thus, according to the Supreme Court, a plaintiff could
establish a prima facie case under the PDA by showing "that she belongs
to the protected class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer
did not accommodate her, and that the employer did accommodate others
'similar in their ability or inability to work."' In response to a prima
facie showing, the employer could rebut this showing by articulating
"legitimate, nondiscriminatory" reasons for denying the accommodation. Finally, the plaintiff would be given the opportunity to show the
employer's articulated reasons were a pretext for a discriminatory
motive." Applying this model of proof, the Supreme Court determined
that the Fourth Circuit decision should be vacated since there was a
dispute as to whether the defendant had provided more favorable
treatment to "at least some employees whose situation cannot reasonably
be distinguished from [the plaintiff's]."" The Court did not determine
whether pretext had in fact been established; rather, the Court left that
decision for the Fourth Circuit on remand.o Regardless of the outcome
of this specific case, however, the case clearly requires a host of
employers to reexamine and revise their existing maternity leave
policies.
Gender-basedSalary Discrimination
The issue of gender-based salary discrimination was before the
Eleventh Circuit in Blackman v. Florida Department of Business
Professional Regulation." The plaintiff had begun her career as a
&

D.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 1347-48.
Id. at 1349.
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1353.
Id. at 1354.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1354, 1355.
Id. at 1356.
599 F. App'x 907 (11th Cir. 2015).
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typist for the Florida Department of Business and Professional
Regulation (DBPR). Following a 20-year career, the plaintiff was
promoted to the position of bureau chief of operations in the Division of
Pari-Mutuel Wagering in 2006. At that time, she received a 14% raise
in salary, earning $57,700. Thereafter, she received a legislativelymandated raise of 3%, which brought her salary to approximately
$59,500. The following year, the state legislature stopped providing its
mandated annual raises. The plaintiff's salary then remained static for
5 years, until January 2012, when she received a 3.4% discretionary
increase to $61,500.42
Upon learning that she made less than two other male division bureau
chiefs and one of her male subordinates, the plaintiff filed suit pursuant
to both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act of 1963,43 alleging genderbased salary discrimination.
The district court granted summary
judgment for the DBPR, finding that the plaintiff had not established a
prima facie case.4
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed. 5 Employing a "burden-shifting framework" similar to that utilized in Title
VII actions, the court of appeals determined that the plaintiff introduced
virtually no evidence on the issue of the "skills and qualifications
actually needed to perform [the comparator's] job."4 '
The court
emphasized the plaintiff's need to present evidence of "actual job
content," and "not just job titles and descriptions," to show the jobs were
"substantially similar."4 7
E.

Employer Defenses

1. EEOC Obligation to Conciliate. In the administrative
framework that must be exhausted prior to filing suit under Title VII,
the first step in the administrative process is to file a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC. 48 The EEOC then investigates the
allegations set forth in the charge.49 In the clear majority of instances,
the EEOC finds no "reasonable cause" to believe the statute has been
violated, and the agency issues a dismissal and notice of rights, which
gives the charging party the right to bring its own lawsuit within ninety

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 908.
29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012).
Blackman, 599 F. App'x at 909.
Id.
Id. at 909, 910.
Id. at 912 (quoting Arrington v. Cobb Cnty., 139 F.3d 865, 876 (11th Cir. 1998)).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
Id.
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days of the notice (if the party so chooses).o However, in those
instances where the EEOC finds "reasonable cause," the statute
mandates that the EEOC must first try to eliminate the alleged
discrimination by "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion" before the agency can file suit on the charging party's

behalf."
The extent to which the EEOC's informal conciliation process may be
subject to judicial review was the issue before the Supreme Court in
Mach Mining, LLC v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.5 2
The employee in question filed a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC, alleging the defendant refused to hire her as a coal miner
because of her gender. Following its investigation, the EEOC determined there was "reasonable cause" to believe the defendant discriminated against the charging party. After conciliation efforts were exhausted,
the EEOC filed suit pursuant to Title VII on the charging party's behalf.
In its answer to the complaint, the defendant asserted the defense that
the EEOC had not met its obligation of conciliating in good faith prior
to filing suit."
The EEOC moved for summary judgment, arguing its conciliation
efforts were not subject to judicial review. The district court denied the
EEOC's motion but certified the issue for immediate appeal. On appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed,
holding the EEOC's conciliation efforts were not subject to judicial
review." On appeal to the Supreme Court, the High Court reversed
the Seventh Circuit." The Supreme Court held the EEOC's conciliation process was subject to judicial review, but the "scope of that review
is narrow."" The Court further held the EEOC retained "extensive
discretion to determine the kind and amount of communication with an
employer appropriate in any given case."" In clarifying the scope of
the EEOC's statutory requirement, the Court determined the EEOC
"must inform the employer about the specific allegation" (which the
Court also noted that the EEOC typically did in its reasonable cause
determination) and "engage the employer in some form of discussion
(whether written or oral), so as to give the employer an opportunity to

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
135 S. Ct. 1645 (2015).
Id. at 1650.
Id.
Id. at 1656.
Id. at 1649.
Id.
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remedy the allegedly discriminatory practice.", 8 Deciding to give the
EEOC a helpful hint as to how to comply with its burden, the Court
went on to state that a sworn "affidavit," verifying that the above
obligations have been met, "will usually suffice to show that it has met
the conciliation requirement."" In the authors' view, the Mach Mining
decision, although recognizing that employers may assert a "failling] to
conciliate in good faith" defense, has so gutted the defense and narrowed
the scope of judicial review that the defense will be of little use in future
litigation."
2. Judicial Estoppel. It has become a routine area of inquiry in
discovery by employers defending employment discrimination actions to
inquire whether the plaintiff has filed a petition for bankruptcy.
Plaintiffs who file a petition for bankruptcy, but fail to disclose their
employment discrimination action in the schedule of assets required for
the bankruptcy proceedings, may be subject to judicial estoppel in their
employment claim. 61 This was precisely the case in D'Antingnac v.
Deere & Co.62 The plaintiff filed a Chapter 13 petition for bankruptcy
in 2005. Three years later in August 2008, while her bankruptcy case
was pending, the plaintiff filed a charge of race discrimination against
the defendant with the EEOC. However, the plaintiff never disclosed
her employment discrimination claim to the bankruptcy court before the
bankruptcy closed in 2009. After the EEOC issued a Dismissal and
Notice of Rights in response to plaintiff's charge in 2010, the plaintiff
filed a race discrimination claim pursuant to Title VII. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendant, finding the plaintiff
was judicially estopped from bringing her employment claim.6 3 On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, relying on its prior decision in
Burnes v. Pemco Arrowplex, Inc. 64 (and other Eleventh Circuit decisions6 5 ), thus reaffirming the efficacy of the judicial estoppel defense in

58. Id. at 1655-56.
59. Id. at 1656.
60. EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 11-cv-00879, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5918, at *2
(S.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2015). Not surprisingly, on remand from the Supreme Court, the district
court determined that the EEOC had met its minimal burden by introducing a cursory
affidavit that closely tracked the Supreme Court's suggested language. See id. at *1.4.
61. See, e.g., D'Antignac v. Deere & Co, 604 F. App'x 875 (11th Cir. 2015).
62. 604 F. App'x 875 (11th Cir. 2015).
63. Id. at 876.
64. 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002).
65. See Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2010); De Leon v.
Comcar Indus., Inc., 321 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003).
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appropriate cases." The fact that the plaintiff had not filed her charge
of discrimination until three years after filing her bankruptcy petition
was of no help to the plaintiff; the Eleventh Circuit held the "Chapter 13
debtor has a continuing statutory duty to amend her schedule of assets
to reflect a claim she raised . . . before the bankruptcy was discharged."67
3. Issue Preclusion. Employers are always prudent to be familiar
with the relevant state law of issue preclusion when determining
whether, and how far, to contest a former employee's claim for unemployment compensation. Sometimes the result can have an unintended
consequence in subsequent employment litigation. Fortunately for the
employer in Green v. Mobis Alabama, LLC, 68 Alabama law on issue
preclusion did not prevent it from asserting its key defense in a wrongful
termination lawsuit." The plaintiff, who worked in the defendant's
paint department, filed an internal complaint *of sexual harassment,
alleging her supervisor sent her inappropriate text messages and made
inappropriate comments. Following an investigation, the supervisor was
terminated. Several months later, the employer terminated the plaintiff
for falsifying doctor's excuses in connection with her requests for leave.
Following her termination, the plaintiff filed a claim for unemployment
benefits. The plaintiff appealed an initial determination denying the
benefits to the Alabama Department of Industrial Relations (ADIR),
which ultimately determined that the employer did not terminate the
plaintiff for misconduct connected with her work. In the plaintiff's
subsequent Title VII action for retaliation (along with several other
claims), the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant.
On appeal before the Eleventh Circuit, the plaintiff argued the
defendant was precluded from re-litigating the reasons for the plaintiff's
discharge, relying upon the successful administrative decision on appeal
by the ADIR.o However, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff's
argument.n The court of appeals held the administrative determination of no misconduct did not mean there was an identity of issues in the
employment litigation.7 2 The court noted that employers have a
reasonable ground for terminating an employee that falls below the

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

D'Antignac, 604 F. App'x at 879.
Id. at 878.
613 F. App'x 788 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 790.
Id. at 791, 792-93, 795.
Id. at 796-97.
Id. at 796.
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necessary threshold to constitute misconduct for unemployment
compensation purposes.
Accordingly, the court held the defendant's reason for terminating the
plaintiff (a good faith belief that she had falsified her doctor's note) had
Hence, the
not been litigated in the administrative proceeding.
doctrine of issue preclusion did not prevent the employer from asserting
its defense.
F

Remedies

1. Arbitration. The Supreme Court decision, DIRECTV Inc. v.
Imburgia,7 although not an employment case, is briefly mentioned here
because of its potential impact on employment arbitrations, which have
become more and more prevalent in recent years. The plaintiffs,
DIRECTV customers, brought suit against DIRECTV seeking damages
for certain early termination fees that the defendant had imposed.
DIRECTV, which had a service agreement with its customers to resolve
all disputes by binding arbitration, moved the trial court to send the
case to arbitration. Both the trial court and the California Court of
Appeals refused to send the case to arbitration, finding the arbitration
provision to be unenforceable under California law because it included
a waiver of class arbitration.
When the case made its way to the Supreme Court, however, the High
Court determined the appellate court's interpretation of California law
was irrelevant since the Federal Arbitration Act7 7 preempted the
waiver issue.7 8 Holding that federal law requires the California Court
of Appeals to enforce the arbitration agreement, the Supreme Court
reversed the California court.7 ' This case is yet another example of the
Supreme Court's broad endorsement of the federal policy favoring
arbitration as a means of resolving disputes.
2. Attorney Fees. It is rarely cost effective to litigate issues
involving an award of attorney fees. However, two such cases made it
to the Eleventh Circuit during this survey period and are worthy of brief
mention. In the first case, Thrner v. Inzer,80 the defendant obtained an

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
Id. at 466-67.
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2012).
DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 471.
Id.
597 F. App'x 621 (11th Cir. 2015).
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award of attorney fees."' The plaintiff had sued the Clerk of Court for
Leon County, Florida, asserting a Title VII race discrimination and
retaliation claim and a state law Whistle Blower Act82 claim. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendant on both
claims. However, with respect to the defendant's motion for an award
of attorney fees, the district court found that the Title VII claim was
frivolous and awarded the defendant attorney fees in the amount of
$29,934.50, but it denied the defendant's motion for fees with respect to
the whistle blower claim, finding that the claim had not been brought in
bad faith." On appeal, although the court of appeals agreed "considerable overlap" existed between the Title VII claim and the whistle blower
claim, the court held the district court properly followed the Supreme
Court decision Fox v. Vice84 in allocating between the two claims;
hence, it determined the district court had not abused its discretion."
In the second case, Maner v. Linkan LLC," the plaintiff won an
award of attorney fees but not nearly as much as she sought." The
plaintiff brought a pregnancy discrimination and retaliation claim under
Title VII against her former employer. The case went to trial, and the
jury ruled in favor of the plaintiff. However, in the post-trial proceeding
addressing the issue of attorney fees and costs, the plaintiff requested
an award of $92,449.88, but the district court awarded only $38,558.31.8 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
reductions.8 9 Initially, the court agreed that the district court properly
excluded the time the attorneys spent litigating the claim for state
unemployment benefits from the award.o Similarly, the court of
appeals held that the attorney travel time to and from the Anniston,
Alabama courthouse during the three-day trial was also properly
excluded." Finally, the court of appeals concluded the district court's

81. Id. at 621.
82. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 112.3187-112.31895 (West 2013) (public employees and
government contractors); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 448.102-448.105 (West 2014) (private
employees).
83. Turner, 597 F. App'x at 621-22.
84. 563 U.S. 826 (2011).
85. Turner, 597 F. App'x at 622.
86. 602 F. App'x 489 (11th Cir. 2015).
87. Id. at 491.
88. Id. at 490-91.
89. Id. at 491.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 492.
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finding of a lower appropriate hourly rate was reasonable based upon
the local market, and hence not clearly erroneous.9 2
II.

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

Five potentially significant Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA)" cases were decided by panels of the court of appeals during
this survey period. Each noteworthy decision will be briefly discussed.
A.

Interference With Third Party Relations

94
In Ashkenazi v. South Broward Hospital District,
the Eleventh
Circuit panel declined to rule that a claim for interference with
employment opportunities with third parties can be stated under the
ADEA." The plaintiff, a medical doctor, challenged the defendant
hospital district's revocation of his surgical privileges. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital district, concluding
the doctor was an independent contractor and not an employee." More
significantly, the district court also ruled the doctor could not proceed
with a third party interference claim because "a patient is not a doctor's
employer.""
The appellate panel agreed with the district court's
conclusion in this regard but on different grounds."
On appeal, the plaintiff asserted for the first time that the hospital
district interfered with an employment relationship he had with another
doctor, rather than with his patients as he had argued in the district
court." Finding the plaintiff had not previously raised this argument
in the district court, the panel first determined this issue was not
properly before it.'o Assuming then, however, the plaintiff properly
preserved the issue, the panel went on to decide the doctor's claim still
failed because he had no existing contractual relationship with the third
party doctor and could not offer any evidence beyond mere speculation
concerning his possible entry into such a relationship.'o

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 494-95.
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2012).
607 F. App'x 958 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 966-67.
Id. at 960.
Id. at 966.
Id.
Id. at 967.
Id.
Id.
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The panel concluded the plaintiff failed to show the hospital district
interfered with an actual existing contractual relationship.10 2 Since
this was so, the plaintiff failed to present an actionable claim under the
ADEA.' 0 3 Continuing to maintain the distinction that exists between
Title VII and the ADEA in interference with third party relations, the
panel concluded in the ADEA context-and under the facts of this
particular case-no cause exists under the ADEA when the plaintiff fails
to show the defendant interfered with an actual, specific employment

relationship. 104
B.

Cat's Paw

Another appeal decided during this survey period where the court of
appeals declined to engraft jurisprudence from another anti-discrimination law into the ADEA was Godwin v. WellStar Health System, Inc.'"o
There, the court of appeals was asked to consider the possible application of the cat's paw doctrine in ADEA cases."0o The appeal provided
the court of appeals with an opportunity to consider the correct
application of a Title VII Supreme Court decision, Staub v. Proctor
Hospital,o' which was brought under the Uniform Services Employment in Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA)0 0o in 2011.09
In Staub, the Supreme Court held the following: "[I]f a supervisor
performs an act motivated by [a prohibited] animus that is intended by
the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is
a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer
is liable under USERRA."" 0
Rejecting the offer, the court of appeals in Godwin affirmed its 2013
decision in Sims v. MVM, Inc.,"' that the "motivating factor" standard

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. Under Title VII, such claims have long been recognized as actionable. See
Pardazi v. Cullman Med. Ctr., 838 F.2d 1155, 1156 (11th Cir. 1988).
105. 615 F. App'x 518 (11th Cir. 2015).
106. Id. at 526.
107. 562 U.S. 411 (2011). In Staub, the Court held an employer may be liable for a
subordinate supervisor's bias if the plaintiff can prove the biased supervisor intended to
cause a neutral decision maker to take an adverse action against the plaintiff and the
supervisor's action proximately caused the ultimate adverse action. Id. at 422.
108. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4334 (2012).
109. Godwin, 615 F. App'x at 528.
110. 562 U.S. at 422 (emphasis in original).
111. 704 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2013). In Sims, the court held that in a cat's paw case
an ADEA plaintiff must also prove the subordinate supervisor's "but-for" causation or
"determinative influence" over the ultimate adverse action, not merely proximate causation.
Id. at 1336.
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set forth in Staub does not apply in cases alleging age discrimination
under the ADEA." 2 Explaining that the causation standards under
USERRA and the ADEA are significantly different, the court of appeals
further observed that an ADEA plaintiff's burden is different:
Thus, in order to succeed under a cat's paw theory of liability, an
ADEA plaintiff must show more than that her adverse employment
action would not have occurred in the absence of the action taken by
the individual .. . with the alleged unlawful animus.

Rather, the

plaintiff must show that the biased individual's action had a "determinative influence" on the ultimate decision . .. or was a "determinative
cause" . . . . And the but-for cause that a biased individual recom-

mended that the plaintiff's employment be terminated does not
constitute a "determinative cause" where "undisputed evidence in the
records supports the employer's assertion that it fired the employee for
its own unbiased reasons that were sufficient in themselves to justify
termination.""'
Notwithstanding its clarification of the proper analysis of the cat's paw
theory in the ADEA context, the panel concluded the district court
improperly granted summary judgment to the defendant on Godwin's
ADEA claim for other reasons. 1 14
C.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Haven v. Board of 'hustees of Three Rivers Regional Library Systemn". was one of several cases decided during the survey period that
refines immunity issues under Georgia law." 6 In 2014, the court of
appeals issued its long awaited decision in Lightfoot v. Henry County
School District,"' which held that since the Georgia school districts
are not arms of the state of Georgia, they are not entitled, under the
to immuniEleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution,
ty from suit."' The decision in Lightfoot clarified the availability of
Eleventh Amendment immunity to constitutional claims against local
governmental agencies in Georgia, and several cases like Haven,
concerning different local government agencies followed in its wake.

Godwin, F. App'x at 528; see also Sims, 704 F.3d at 1336.
Godwin, 615 F. App'x at 529.
Id. at 529-31.
625 F. App'x 929 (11th Cir. 2015).
See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
771 F.3d 764 (11th Cir. 2014).
118. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
119. Lightfoot, 771 F.3d at 778. Lightfoot reaffirmed the continuing vitality of Manders
v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
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After first concluding the arm-of-the-state argument was properly
before it, the Haven panel declined to decide that issue.'2 0 Instead, the
panel remanded the case to the district court to consider whether the
clarified standard set forth in Lightfoot entitled the Three Rivers
Regional Library System to Eleventh Amendment immunity in the first
instance. 121
D.

PrimaFacie Case

In Liebman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,122 an Eleventh
Circuit panel concluded an employee's length of employment in a
particular position, alone, can support an inference the incumbent is
qualified to perform her job for prima facie case purposes under the
ADEA.' 2 3 The panel concluded the district court improperly weighed
evidence concerning the plaintiff's qualifications at the summary
judgment stage.' 2 4
III.

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

Somewhat surprisingly, only one noteworthy ADA decision was
rendered during the survey period. In Hill v. Clayton County School
District,125 the court of appeals concluded, at least in Georgia, air
conditioning can indeed be a reasonable accommodation. 126
The
plaintiff, a public school bus driver, sought air conditioning on her school
bus as an accommodation for her health condition. Her school district
employer delayed responding to her accommodation request for several
months. Suit eventually ensued when the plaintiff was unable to
perform her job without the requested accommodation. The district
court granted the employer summary judgment and the plaintiff
appealed.12
Concluding numerous unresolved fact issues existed concerning the
plaintiff's ADA claim, the appellate panel reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgment on Hill's failure to accommodate claim.1 28
The panel determined, among other issues, the evidence in the case was
disputed as to whether a two-month delay in providing the requested air

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Haven, 625 F. App'x at 934.
Id.
808 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1299.
Id. at 1300.
619 F. App'x 916 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 921.
Id. at 917, 918, 921.
Id. at 921-22.
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conditioning accommodation was reasonable under the circumstances. 129
IV.

SECTION 1983

Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Pellitteri v. Prine"10 is another of the Eleventh Amendment immunity decisions from Georgia rendered during this survey period.'"' The
appellate panel in Pellittericoncluded Georgia sheriffs act as arms of the
State when hiring and firing deputies.1 32 Consequently, the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 § 1983133 provides immunity to sheriffs for claims
concerning such decisions.1 34
To the same effect, in Ballard v. Chattooga County Board of Tax
Assessors,'13 a panel concluded county tax assessment boards are also
arms of the state of Georgia and, thus, entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity. 131
A.

B.

Public Employee Speech
Several interesting opinions concerning § 1983 public employee speech
were decided during this survey period. 3 71In Moss v. City of Pembroke
Pines,'3 ' a panel affirmed the district court's grant of judgment as a
matter of law in favor of the public employer.13 9 The court of appeals
determined the district court correctly found an assistant fire chief was
speaking in furtherance of his job responsibilities and not as a citizen
when he complained about his public employer's budgeting practices. 40
Moss had been a firefighter for the City for over twenty years.
Additionally, he served on the City's pension board. In 2009, the City
claimed budget shortfalls and sought pension concessions from its
employees, including its firefighters. Believing the City was negotiating

129. Id. at 922.
130. 776 F.3d 777 (11th Cir. 2015).
131. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
132. 776 F.3d at 783.
133. 42. U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
134. Pellitteri, 776 F. 3d at 783.
135. 615 F. App'x 621 (11th Cir. 2015).
136. Id. at 628.
137. These cases indicate that courts continue to struggle with the proper application
of the teachings contained in the Supreme Court decision Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410
(2006), to real life situations.
138. 782 F.3d 613 (11th Cir. 2015).
139. Id. at 622.
140. Id. at 620-21.
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in bad faith over these matters and the claimed budget crisis was not
real, Moss spoke out on numerous occasions in different contexts. His
position of employment was eliminated by the City the following year
and he was consequently terminated from employment. Moss thereafter
brought suit contending he had been fired in retaliation for his earlier
speech. Following the close of evidence at trial, the City moved for
judgment as a matter of law on Moss's speech claim, and the district
court granted the City's motion, finding that Moss had been speaking as
a private citizen.141 On appeal, the panel agreed and affirmed.1 4 2
The panel concluded none of the specific statements Moss claimed got
him fired factored in that decision.14 3
In Polion v. City of Greensboro,144 another panel determined a police
officer's complaints about his superiors were not the substantial
motivating factor in the termination of his employment. 14 Relying on
Moss, and utilizing the four-part test set forth within that earlier
decision, the panel concluded Polion failed to present sufficient evidence
to demonstrate his complaints about his superiors "were a substantial
motivating factor for his termination.l 46 Rather, the panel determined
the undisputed evidence showed Polion had been terminated from
employment for entirely different reasons.1 47
Finally, in Alves v. Board of Regents of the University System of
Georgia, ' former employees were speaking as employees-rather than
as citizens-when complaining about matters related to their employment.1 49 A split panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the employer."'o Circuit Judge Beverly Martin dissented,
opining the following: "I believe the First Amendment affords more
protection to public employees than the Majority opinion allows."'
The Majority concluded five psychologists working at a university
counseling and testing center were speaking as employees when they
criticized their superior in written grievances.15 2 The employees had

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 616-17.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 620.
614 F. App'x 396 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 400-01.
Id. at 398-99.
Id. at 399-400.
804 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1168.
Id.
Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1153.
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been laid off as part of a reduction-in-force after complaining." They
contended the workforce reduction was pretextual and that they had
been terminated from employment in retaliation for complaining about
the leadership and management practices of the center director.'5 4
The district court found that the complaints "constituted employee
speech on an issue related to their professional duties, which would not
be subject to First Amendment protection, and granted summary
judgment ... on that ground."" A majority of the panel affirmed."'
In reaching this conclusion, the majority relied on the four-part test
articulated earlier during the survey period in Moss.15 7
C.

Public Employee Loyalty

In the only other noteworthy § 1983 appeal decided during this survey
period, a panel concluded political loyalty is an appropriate job
requirement for a Georgia deputy sheriff. In Ezell v. Wynn,"' the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that while the First Amendment 59 generally protects public employees from adverse employment actions based on
political patronage, in certain instances, political loyalty may be an
To reach that conclusion, it was
appropriate job requirement. 6 0
necessary for the panel to wend its decisional way through a long history
of Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit public employee loyalty
jurisprudence.1 6 ' At the end of that journey, the panel held, based
upon its precedent, it was "bound to conclude that political loyalty is an
appropriate requirement for the position of deputy sheriff in Georgia."162

V.

SECTION

1985

Only one noteworthy decision under § 1985 of the Civil Rights Act of
187116 was rendered during the survey period. In Forsberg v. Pefanis,164 a panel concluded § 1985 makes punitive damages available to

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1159-68.
802 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2015).
U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
Ezell, 802 F.3d at 1226.
Id. at 1223-25.
Id. at 1226.
42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2012).
No. 10-10100, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21402, at *1 (11th Cir. Dec. 11, 2015).
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a prevailing plaintiff even when no compensatory damages are awarded.' 6 5 The panel adopted the position of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on this question.1 66
The case is particularly interesting because of its backstory. The
plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging the defendant touched her
inappropriately and made lewd remarks concerning her in the presence
of others. In his attempted defense to the suit, Pefanis filed a false
written statement he obtained from one of Forsberg's co-workers and
subsequently ended up pleading guilty to conspiracy to obstruct justice
when caught. The district court struck Pefanis' answer to the complaint
as a sanction. Forsberg's claims were eventually tried to a jury, which
The jury, however, awarded
returned a verdict against Pefanis.
Forsberg only punitive damages."' The appeal ensued.16

165. Id.
166. Id. (relying on Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1352
(7th Cir. 1995)).
167. Id. at *1, *2.
168. Id. at *2.

